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Abstract—Clear presentation of uncertainty is an exception rather than rule in media articles, data-driven reports, and consumer
applications, despite proposed techniques for communicating sources of uncertainty in data. This work considers, Why do so many
visualization authors choose not to visualize uncertainty? I contribute a detailed characterization of practices, associations, and
attitudes related to uncertainty communication among visualization authors, derived from the results of surveying 90 authors who
regularly create visualizations for others as part of their work, and interviewing thirteen influential visualization designers. My re-
sults highlight challenges that authors face and expose assumptions and inconsistencies in beliefs about the role of uncertainty in
visualization. In particular, a clear contradiction arises between authors’ acknowledgment of the value of depicting uncertainty and
the norm of omitting direct depiction of uncertainty. To help explain this contradiction, I present a rhetorical model of uncertainty
omission in visualization-based communication. I also adapt a formal statistical model of how viewers judge the strength of a signal in
a visualization to visualization-based communication, to argue that uncertainty communication necessarily reduces degrees of free-
dom in viewers’ statistical inferences. I conclude with recommendations for how visualization research on uncertainty communication
could better serve practitioners’ current needs and values while deepening understanding of assumptions that reinforce uncertainty
omission.
Index Terms—Uncertainty visualization, graphical statistical inference, visualization rhetoric.
1 INTRODUCTION
Consider the last few visualizations you encountered outside of scien-
tific publications. Perhaps you read a news article backed by data, or
researched a product, or used a transit application to plan a trip. Did
the visualizations depict uncertainty–the possibility that the observed
data or model predictions could take on a set of possible values?
Chances are, they did not. Of 612 data visualizations from 121 arti-
cles published online in February 2019 by a set of leading purveyors of
data journalism, social science surveys, and economic estimates1, 449
(73%) presented data intended for inference, but only 14 (3%) por-
trayed uncertainty visually, either by depicting explicit quantifications
like intervals or conveying variance through raw data.
There are many reasons why visualization practitioners and other
data communicators might choose to exclude uncertainty information.
Some stem from user experience concerns: authors may perceive un-
certainty to be challenging to viewers based on psychological com-
plexity. When a probability is 0 or 1, it can be validated; when it is
not, how it should be interpreted is debatable [13]. When visualiza-
tions are used to communicate and inform, as in public-facing reports,
media presentations, business reporting, and end-user applications, the
attention of the viewer is often at a high premium. Authors may ques-
tion the necessity of adding more information to an already complex
display. Moreover, even expert scientists and analysts can struggle
to accurately calculate uncertainty [53], and finding visualization ap-
proaches that are accessible and applicable across data and visual for-
mats remains a research challenge. Still other reasons may be rhetori-
cal. Authors may want to signal confidence, perceiving uncertainty to
undercut the credibility of their results based on unstated norms.
The goal of this paper is to understand: Why isn’t uncertainty vi-
sualized more often in visualization-based communication? The first
step in this inquiry is to identify how visualization authors perceive
and use uncertainty representation. I contribute the results of a survey
of 90 professional visualization authors and interviews with thirteen
influential professional visualization designers and journalists. I use
these results to characterize how communicative visualization authors
understand and engage with uncertainty visualization. In the process,
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I identify unaddressed challenges in current practice that visualization
researchers may find worth devoting attention to. For example, authors
express the need for resources to help them develop text-based expla-
nations and produce broadly understandable visual representations.
My second contribution is a rhetorical model of uncertainty omis-
sion in communicative visualization. A set of model tenets summa-
rize beliefs that authors appeal to in rationalizing the omission of un-
certainty from visualizations. The model describes visualization as a
means of both conveying and producing “signal”, which is validated
by the author’s analysis process for both authors and viewers, but be-
lieved to be obfuscated by exposing uncertainty.
The goals are twofold. First, by capturing pervasive beliefs in three
model tenets, the model provides a concise explanation for how a norm
of uncertainty omission may persist despite many authors’ professed
belief in the importance of uncertainty visualization. Secondly, an un-
derstanding of pervasive rationales can help visualization researchers
and others devote their efforts toward addressing the beliefs or needs
for resources that motivate well-intentioned authors to omit uncer-
tainty.
My third contribution is to propose a formalism for the signal-
judgment mechanism implied by the rhetorical model. I apply a sta-
tistical model of graphical inference proposed for analysis to commu-
nicative visualization, using it to demonstrate how uncertainty visual-
ization necessarily reduces flexibility in viewers’ processes for judg-
ing a visualization’s signal. I summarize multiple logical inconsisten-
cies implied by authors’ perceptions as summarized in the rhetorical
model. I conclude with a discussion of how visualization research
could more directly address authors’ needs and deepen understanding
of perceptions around uncertainty.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Communicating Uncertainty for Decision Making
Scientific discourse, which lays the groundwork for evidence-based
decision making, is largely a discussion of uncertainty. However, of-
ten the level of detail in the scientific literature on a topic or method
is inappropriate for a decision-maker, either because it is too minute
to easily decipher or fails to state assumptions that are important but
assumed known among scientists [20]. An analogous scenario occurs
in data analysis contexts, where analysts spend time identifying and
evaluating the robustness of patterns in visualized data. Reproduc-
ing their complete analysis workflow to communicate results would
be overwhelming to users in many cases. Hence, visualization authors
engage in a rhetorical process involving editorial decisions to omit,
emphasize, and otherwise transform results to guide an audience to-
ward intended interpretations [29].
For a visualization author to successfully communicate uncertainty,
they must 1) recognize the value of uncertainty information for re-
ceivers of their messages, and 2) identify effective ways to communi-
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cate it. Threats to the successful completion of both steps can arise.
For example, an author may choose not to acknowledge uncertainty
if they feel uncomfortable conveying numerical estimates of risk. Prior
research suggests that experts or analysts typically prefer to communi-
cate uncertainty in qualitative terms, fearing misinterpretation if they
state uncertainty, though decision makers and other end-users of re-
ports typically prefer to receive uncertainty in precise quantitative
terms [15, 46]. Other proposed reasons that a communicator may be
resistant to the idea of presenting uncertainty include: fear that uncer-
tainty information will imply unwarranted precision in estimates [19],
a tendency to think that the presence of uncertainty is common knowl-
edge [19], a tendency to think that non-expert audiences will not un-
derstand the uncertainty information [19, 44], a belief that not present-
ing uncertainty will simplify decision making [44], a belief that people
cannot tolerate uncertainty [44], a belief that uncertainty creates neg-
ative feelings [44], a belief that not presenting uncertainty will make
it easier to coordinate beliefs [44], and a belief that presenting it will
make their message seem less credible [19, 44].
Breakdowns may also occur when uncertainty is communicated.
Fischoff [18] summarizes possible breakdowns in a set of “develop-
mental stages” in risk communication: “All we have to do is: 1) get
the numbers right; 2) tell them the numbers; 3) explain what we mean
by the numbers; 4) show them they’ve accepted similar risks in the
past; 5) show them it’s a good deal for them; 6) treat them nice; 7)
make them partners; 8) all of the above.”
Scholarly work describing rationales like those above has largely
been based on empirical evidence around uncertainty comprehension
(e.g., the large body of research on overconfidence among those pre-
sented with uncertain information [22, 21, 38]) or anecdotal evidence
(e.g., a former director of the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO)
statement that “You can’t give the client a bound. The client needs
a point” [44]). Researchers in economics and visualization have sug-
gested that omitting uncertainty information from data presentations
may result from an unstated norm [17, 42]. I attempt to directly elicit
authors’ perceptions about uncertainty and associated norms by con-
ducting a survey and interviews.
Some studies have examined how data workers manage
uncertainty–including attempts to understand, diagnose, mini-
mize, exploit, and suppress it–as they attempt to extract insights from
data [5, 33, 39, 50, 51]. These accounts establish that even “experts”
struggle to properly quantify and manage uncertainty. Several studies
describe data workers’ perceptions of the difficulty of communicating
uncertainty and a tension between their goals of transparency and
accuracy and decision-makers’ desires for simplicity [5, 33, 51].
2.2 Visualizing Uncertainty
Research in uncertainty visualization starts with quantified uncertainty
and considers how to best visually express it. Researchers have tax-
onomized sources of, and representations for, uncertainty [27, 32, 40,
47, 49, 51, 52] and demonstrated techniques intended for analysts and
other experts (e.g., [1, 12, 14, 49, 54, 55]). More recently, researchers
have proposed and evaluated visualizations intended for non-experts
as well as experts, such as hypothetical outcome plots [31, 34], quan-
tile dotplots [16, 35], value suppressing palettes [10], and gradient and
violin plots [9]). However, few researchers in uncertainty visualiza-
tion have devoted attention to why uncertainty visualization remains
uncommon in practice, or whether authors’ needs are met by the out-
puts of research on visualizing uncertainty. Exceptions include papers
that speculate on how authors may see uncertainty metadata as no dif-
ferent from other metadata and include it only as secondary [4], may
struggle to find representations that are compatible with the data, tasks,
and organizational goals [4], and may find it difficult to evaluate the
impact of uncertainty on visualization-based judgments [4, 30].
3 METHODS
The characterization of practices and associations around uncertainty
visualization that I contribute is based on formative research conducted
over seven months in 2018 and 2019. During this time, I surveyed
visualization authors and interviewed a smaller set of authors I per-
ceive to be influential among visualization practitioners. The questions
posed in this work are unlikely to be answered to satisfaction by a sin-
gle study; however, for the purposes of this initial inquiry I stopped ag-
gressively recruiting new participants once responses seemed to con-
verge on a set of widely held rationales.
3.1 Survey of Visualization Creators
Between December 2018 and May 2019 I conducted an online survey
of 90 visualization authors in a convenience sample. I shared the sur-
vey link on Twitter several times over this period. The recruitment text
described target respondents as those who “regularly create visualiza-
tions for others.” The headline began “Attn vis designers, developers,
journalists...” To incentivize participation, one $50 Amazon gift card
was awarded to a randomly drawn respondent for each 20 respondents
(5 gift cards total).
Fig. 1: Summary of the types of organizations interviewees and survey
respondents are associated with.
3.1.1 Survey Design
The online survey (17 required questions) aimed to identify how of-
ten respondents depict uncertainty, why they sometimes choose not to,
and what sorts of design guidelines or other considerations they as-
sociate with uncertainty. Six required questions in the first section of
the survey asked respondents to consider their visualization work over
the past year and state how often, and how, they had visualized uncer-
tainty, and whether they had tried to include it but opted not to, and
why not. A second section of 8 required questions asked respondents
to rate their agreement with the statements depicted in Figure 3 using
a 5 point scale labeled from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree
(5). In a final section of 3 required questions, respondents were asked
to describe their position, the audience for which they most frequently
created visualizations, the frequency with which they authored visu-
alizations for others, and optionally the organization they worked for
and links to their work.
3.1.2 Participants
A total of 90 visualization authors completed the survey as of May
2019. Table 1 describes the sample. Given the use of a convenience
sample recruited on social media, selection bias is likely, such as to-
wards authors who have spent time thinking about uncertainty or are
more likely to think it should be expressed. I did my best to remain
aware of this possible selection bias in analysis by avoiding interpret-
ing the absolute frequency of responses or assuming the rationales pro-
vide an exhaustive description.
3.2 Interviews with Influential Visualization Creators
In gain a deeper understanding of potential causes of inconsistencies
in attitudes and practices that the survey results exposed, I conducted
semi-structured interviews with thirteen people I consider to be “visu-
alization influencers” who do not self-identify as researchers (6 fe-
male) between February and June 2019. Figure 1 summarizes the
sectors in which interviewees worked. All thirteen interviewees have
Twitter accounts, with a median of 4.7k followers (mean: 11k).
3.3 Analyzing Responses
Fig. 2: The list of audiences that
survey respondents described creat-
ing visualizations for. Respondents
could choose multiple answers.
All survey responses were
recorded via Google forms.
Eleven of the interviews were
transcribed by a professional
transcriptionist. Two of the
interviews were not recorded.
To identify values and ra-
tionales in the results of
the above activities, I started
with open coding to identify
themes, then iterated over the
responses several times until
the codes stabilized [11]. For
both survey and interview re-
sults, I categorized under-
standings of the term “uncer-
tainty visualization,” descriptions of how participants depicted uncer-
tainty (if applicable), rationales for not expressing uncertainty, and
perceptions of the value of uncertainty. Related to rationales for not
expressing uncertainty, I also coded statements that seemed aimed
at describing a perceived status quo, which became the basis for the
rhetorical model.
4 SUMMARY OF UNCERTAINTY ASSOCIATIONS & PRACTICES
4.1 Uncertainty Visualization: What and How?
To set the context for the online survey and interviews, participants
were first asked to describe what they thought of when hearing the
term “uncertainty visualization.” The most prevalent responses de-
scribed uncertainty as an interval, range, or region (roughly half of
respondents), often in conjunction with error bars. Mentions of pos-
sible outcomes and/or the possibility that plotted values may not rep-
resent the real values (roughly 15%) were also common. Probability,
confidence, variance, error, missing data, and sampling and modeling
artifacts were each mentioned by multiple respondents. While most
of these initial impressions did not include value judgments, a hand-
ful of online survey respondents defined uncertainty visualization by
referring to tensions between uncertainty and other design goals, like
“how to convey the possibility of divergence from a projection with-
out casting doubt on the fundamental measurements or reports” and “a
visualization that doesn’t have a clear message.”
When asked whether they had depicted uncertainty in any visualiza-
tions they had created in the last year, roughly three quarters (76%) of
survey respondents replied yes. When asked about occasions on which
authors had communicated uncertainty, survey respondents and inter-
viewees mentioned a number of techniques consistent with an under-
standing of uncertainty as error or probability. Surveyed authors most
commonly described using interval representations (75%), visual vari-
ables to encode probability or confidence (75%), density plots or his-
tograms (54%), and text representations (51%). However, uncertainty
as a qualitative expression of a gap in knowledge came up in most
interviews with interviewees as well as several survey responses. 62%
of survey respondents had used text to warn their viewers of the po-
tential for uncertainty in results. Several interviewees described how
they had more experience thinking deeply about qualitative forms of
uncertainty (I1, I4, I5), like a lack of available explanation for how a
particular quantitative prediction would come to be (e.g., in what order
and at how constant a rate certain climate changes come about).
Several respondents spontaneously associated uncertainty with pro-
cess, including “Even communicating uncertainty may also require
communicating fundamental hermeneutics and methodologies of that
information,” and “the answer to the question someone will inevitably
ask ‘how did you get these numbers?”’
Uncertainty was also associated with resolution. One interviewee
who works in industry described uncertainty as a symptom of the gran-
ularity or resolution of a plot: “I approach uncertainty a lot of times by
trying to peel back layers instead of being like ‘Let’s look at an average
value and try to get some sense of what the distribution is under that.
Can I actually just show all of the data that they have available?” (I6).
Roughly 5% of survey respondents described uncertainty as variance,
which is shown by simply plotting raw data.
Multiple survey respondents and interviewees alluded to uncer-
tainty visualizations that defied the conventional definition of uncer-
tainty as a quantitative probabilistic representation. Uncertainty was
associated with visual inexactitude, or encodings intentionally cho-
sen to imply imprecision, by four interviewees and a handful of sur-
vey respondents. One freelance interviewee described his choices in
visualizing imprecise estimates: “What we did with this one, because
anything that would have give us a precise treatment would’ve been
making something precise that is not, we actually used different bins....
Because it’s not plotting on an exact axis point, risk scale equals im-
plied precision. That was the intent” (I4). The interviewee went on
to mention perceptual accuracy rankings for visual encodings “if you
back down to the classic perceptual rankings, that kind of thing, those
that are lower down the rankings of perceptual accuracy do work in my
view.” Another freelance interviewee (I1) described the use of circular
area and conjoined marks with difficult to resolve boundaries as strate-
gies for visualizing uncertainty that did not involve explicitly mapping
quantified uncertainty to visual properties.
Several survey respondents and four interviewees (I1, I4, I6, I8)
also described the possibility of communicating uncertainty through a
progression of views depicting patterns that are more to less prob-
able, an interpretation that is not usually considered in scholarly re-
search on uncertainty visualization. A survey respondent attributed a
design pattern to the work of one of the interviewees: “[interviewee]
shows a useful way of communicating uncertainty with small multi-
ples. It breaks down observations into three bins: 1) this is something
that we’ve seen at least once; 2) this is something that we see some-
times; and 3) this is something that we see all the time.” To respon-
dents, patterns like these appeared to inhabit a middle ground between
qualitative uncertainty that might be best expressed in text and explicit
visual representation of quantified uncertainty.
4.2 Failure & Voluntary Omission
Though the majority of online survey respondents and interviewees
said they had communicated uncertainty in at least one visualization in
the previous year, their estimated percentage indicated that uncertainty
visualization is a relatively rare phenomena: over one third of online
survey respondents indicated that 10% or less of the visualizations they
had created communicated uncertainty. Only one quarter described
communicating uncertainty in 50% or more of their visualizations.
Moreover, nearly half of survey respondents admitted to having in-
tended or attempted to communicate uncertainty in a visualization they
had created in the prior year, but had not ultimately included the un-
certainty. Roughly one third of the interviewees described instances
where uncertainty information was calculated or discussed among the
authoring team but not included. Frequently cited reasons among sur-
vey respondents for not including uncertainty on these occasions were
not wanting to confuse or overwhelm viewers (53/85; 62%), not hav-
ing access to uncertainty information (40/85; 47%), not knowing how
to calculate uncertainty (22/85; 26%), and not wanting to make data
seem questionable (15/85; 17%).
4.2.1 Expected Difficulties for Viewers
Concerns that uncertainty information may overwhelm or confuse
viewers were echoed in other comments provided by survey respon-
dents and interviewees. The belief that a visualization that explic-
itly represented uncertainty requires more effort than a visualization
without it was implicit in many of these comments. One freelance
interviewee described how the efforts required in readers’ time and
energy and sophistication should be “rewarded with sufficient insight
to understand [the uncertainty information]” (I4). Another who works
in industry described how explicit uncertainty representation means
that readers “have to come to you with patience, already have the pa-
tience needed to endure your explanation” (I8). That uncertainty could
provoke psychological anxiety was also suggested by several intervie-
wees; as one journalism interviewee put it “People have a lot of anxiety
once they acknowledge even a small gap in something” (I3). Survey
respondents and several interviewees (I2, I8) alluded to empathy for
the viewer as a possible motivation for uncertainty omission: “Be-
cause I’m separated from the analysis, my question often ends up in
rhetoric and ethics a lot more than it does ‘Am I truthfully portray-
ing information?’ It’s much more about what does the audience care
about, building a sort of empathy, if I can, with the audience; what
difficulties they’re going to encounter trying to learn the information”
(I8).
4.2.2 Difficulties for Authors
In contrast to viewer-related concerns, not having access to uncertainty
information or not knowing how to calculate uncertainty are author
resource limits. Their prevalence suggest that some authors do not
have the tools or knowledge needed to follow through with uncer-
tainty representation. When asked for additional reasons that they had
not presented uncertainty information in their recent visualizations, a
handful of survey respondents mentioned time and other constraints
directly. Multiple authors also referred to not being able to visual-
ize uncertainty satisfactorily. As one visualization interviewee from
industry described, “we lack canonical forms for lay audiences” (I7).
Several other interviewees described how stakeholders they worked
with on visualizations questioned the value of the effort required to
include uncertainty explicitly: “it was an economic question. I had
to develop the visualizations. They didn’t want to pay for me to put
all the time in we would need to fully do a good explainer” (I8). In
describing resistance to visually representing uncertainty in graphic
reports, a journalism interviewee explained: “They know they’re going
to have to help work on labels to describe it. That’s energy that could,
in their eyes, perhaps be better spent elsewhere” (I5).
A related set of concerns framed uncertainty as opportunity for au-
thor error. Multiple interviewees provided rationales for not present-
ing uncertainty that resembled what behavioral economists describe
as a perception of “misplaced precision” [19, 43] for which an author
might later be blamed. One industry interviewee, who described them-
self as “probably hav[ing] more stats cred than other data vis people,”
questioned whether it was “better to add something indicating uncer-
tainty if you don’t feel like you have a lot of confidence in those num-
bers” (I6), suggesting qualitative expressions of uncertainty as a likely
alternative that they and other authors might consider instead. “There’s
somewhat of a worry of I’m not a hundred percent. If I’m going to in-
clude uncertainty, I want it to be really good. I place both into the
sense of ‘there’s uncertainty about uncertainty, so if I put a number
on it, what if I’m wrong?”’ (I6). The possibility that not presenting
uncertainty could mean viewers’ would infer even more precision was
not raised by authors.
When asked for reasons for uncertainty omission that they had ob-
served among colleagues, a journalism interviewee (I3) described how
often authors found it difficult to calculate and describe uncertainty or
the model assumptions used to derive it. When asked what they per-
ceived to be the most helpful resource to bring about more uncertainty
representation in the media, they concluded “What I really want are
better word equivalent versions.” Other journalism and freelance in-
terviewees echoed the challenges with explaining uncertainty (I4, I5,
I12).
4.3 Attitudes on the Importance of Uncertainty
A majority of the surveyed authors expressed a belief that uncertainty
should be visualized or explicitly represented more often than it cur-
rently is than less. An optimism about uncertainty representation is
suggested by a left skewed distributions of agreement among online
survey respondents with the statements “It is important to always
present uncertainty information when presenting data” (Figure 3a),
“Uncertainty information should be presented in a way that forces
users to take it into account” (b) and “Uncertainty information should
be presented when it calls into question the main message or pattern
shown in the visualization” (Figure 3d).
This sentiment was echoed by most of the interviewees. Nearly all
interviewees described visualizing uncertainty more often as a goal or
remarked on a feeling of responsibility that they should be doing it
more often.
Some of the reasons behind the desire to visualize uncertainty more
often appeared to be driven by a sense of responsibility to accu-
rate presentation. Survey respondents insinuated the importance of
transparency in presentations of data, suggesting that omitting uncer-
tainty was misleading or even lying. One interviewee described feel-
ing “mildly guilty” for not representing uncertainty more often (I6).
Several interviewees also described how they perceived uncertainty
representation to have educational potential (I5, I7, I13). Another
journalism interviewee described wanting to show uncertainty more
often to help their audiences become accustomed to what scientific
measurement is like: “I feel like once readers start to understand that
there’s uncertainty inherent in a lot of these things, it’s still signifi-
cant. To get used to the idea that this can be very rigorous and still
have a range of uncertainty, that’s where I feel like I need to get bet-
ter at not just saying, ‘Well, we’ll just show these data points”’ (I5).
A survey respondent similarly argued for uncertainty presentation as a
default because “otherwise people won’t get better at realizing nuances
in data.” These comments suggest that some authors perceive uncer-
tainty omission as a normative practice that prevents viewers from de-
veloping certain abilities.
4.3.1 Inconsistency & Heterogeneity in Attitudes
Perhaps the most striking observation in the survey responses and in-
terviews was the degree of heterogeneity and even inconsistency in
attitudes around some considerations. Despite the left skew in agree-
ment with “It is important to always present uncertainty information
when presenting data,” nearly 28% of survey respondents rated their
agreement as neutral and another 14% leaned negative. Agreement
with statements that “visualizations should have a clear, unambiguous
message” (Figure 3e), that “most audiences cannot understand uncer-
tainty information” (Figure 3c), and that “people are not interested in
uncertainty information” (Figure 3f) were even more ambiguous.
Some inconsistencies may stem from the difficulty of capturing the
heterogeneity of visualization design and interpretation strategies with
simple high level statements. For instance, task-specific concerns are
inevitable in visualization design. Several survey respondents and
most interviewees described taking care to identify the task or in-
ference that a visualization should support, and indicated that some
tasks might warrant presenting uncertainty more than others. How-
ever, the tension I observed—between authors’ various conceptions of
the communicative function of a visualization and their associations
with uncertainty—seemed unlikely to be fully explained by taking into
account tasks. Despite the optimism among most of the interviewees,
in nearly every interview, I observed some form of inconsistency be-
tween the implied desire for more uncertainty and the interviewee’s
statements about sufficient or ideal practices for uncertainty.
For example, one journalism interviewee (I3) acknowledged the im-
portance of uncertainty representation and described their stance that it
should happen much more often, including in their team’s work. How-
ever, when later asked for instances of projects where they thought un-
certainty should have been more explicitly represented, they defended
the practices they commonly use to “vet” the information for signs of
unreliability before publishing the visualization. Another industry in-
terviewee with statistical training in their background mused that “in
theory, I should have a lot of uncertainty. I’m working with very hard-
core statisticians and machine learning experts and scientists, and yet
I don’t explicitly include uncertainty in my visualizations ever. It was
actually quite interesting, after you prompt, thinking about why” (I6).
Hence authors who seem clearly capable of calculating and represent-
ing uncertainty well, who occupy roles in which they have the freedom
to experiment, and who expressed interest in representing uncertainty
more often, seemed unable to produce self-satisfying reasons for why
they did not represent uncertainty more often.
5 A RHETORICAL MODEL OF UNCERTAINTY OMISSION
I propose a model to explain how authors’ perceptions of the function
of visualizations and uncertainty may contribute to a norm of omis-
Fig. 3: Survey participants’ ratings of their agreement with statements on a 5pt scale (1=Strongly Disagree, 5=Strongly Agree).
sion despite professed acknowledgement of the value of uncertainty.
The model is rhetorical, in that it explains how authors make deci-
sions aimed to guiding interpretations within a larger system of com-
munication conventions and semantic associations [29]. The model is
epistemological, in that it concerns how knowledge is constructed.
The model is premised upon the fact that uncertainty omission is a
norm. Three tenets capture pervasive associations that give rise to this
norm. Tenet 1 states that in communicative visualization, visualiza-
tions are representations of a message or signal that an author wishes
to convey to an audience. Tenet 2 describes how analytical process
validates the signal for both authors and viewers, though only authors
typically have access to this process while viewers trust the process
without experiencing it. Tenet 3 proposes that uncertainty functions
as a question or seam in the message that threatens the validity of the
signal for statistical, attentional, or normative social reasons.
5.1 Premise: Uncertainty Omission is a Norm
The low proportion of uncertainty visualizations out of authors’ total
visualizations and fact that nearly 20% of authors did not recall com-
municating uncertainty at all in the last year suggests that avoiding
explicit representation of uncertainty in visualization presentations is
a norm, or generally accepted standard for behavior.
Multiple comments from interviewees and survey respondents sup-
port this tenet. One journalism interviewee explicitly described in-
creasing the frequency with which they visualized uncertainty in their
work as having the potential to “help shift what the norm is overall for
all the public in terms of representing these things” (I5). Another jour-
nalism interviewee summarized the relative lack of uncertainty com-
munication in their organization as “no one cares” (I3). An indus-
try interviewee who previously worked with scientists described how
“in scientific communication for the public, the general consensus has
been don’t quantify your uncertainty” (I8). After commenting on one
organization’s use of error bars and other uncertainty representation,
another freelance interviewee commented “I do think a lot of places
are mired in this cultural practice that no one’s ever challenged and
thought, ‘Do we need to provide this?’ Maybe some people need to,
but most people do not” (I4). A survey respondent described how their
work “would not be accepted by politicians because other analysts
never describe uncertainty so my more robust visualizations appear
less valid if I am transparent.”
5.2 Tenet 1: A Visualization Expresses a Signal
Despite ambiguity in the distribution of agreement among surveyed
authors with the statement “A visualization should present a clear mes-
sage,” most interviewees and many survey respondents alluded to con-
veying a signal or message as the primary function of visualization-
based communication.
A journalist interviewee described how conveying a clear signal
with a visualization was “related to how you think about stories as
a journalist, you want to simplify and deliver one core message with
some contextualization” (I2). Another interviewee described how
hearing from their scientist collaborators that “we helped make their
point a little bit clearer to folks”(I5) was a sign of visualization effec-
tiveness. Multiple other interviewees confirmed this (I3, I6, I9), for
example, an industry interviewee describing how the best feedback on
a visualization was how to make the signal stronger (I6).
The signal in a visualization was not expressed by authors as a par-
ticular kind of message or statistic, but instead appeared to represent
a simplification or a proxy for an idea in which the author and the
viewer share an interest. Authors mentioned specific examples from
their work at times, including the magnitude of single values or dif-
ferences between values, to trends, to relationships or connections be-
tween data or trends.
Authors also suggested that a signal is a crystallization or abstrac-
tion of something more complex. One freelance interviewee described
the restraint they must consistently maintain in designing a visualiza-
tion, “There’s always a creeping temptation, not just from the client to
say as much as possible, but also myself. I get caught up in the mood
of a subject and think, ‘That’s interesting. That’s interesting.”’ (I4).
Finally, many authors implied that a signal has a truth value, as in
equating uncertainty visualization with “how to convey the possibil-
ity of divergence from a projection without casting doubt on the fun-
damental measurements or reports,” descriptions of using the design
process to identify patterns that were “more signal than noise” (I3)
and the use of terms like “iffy” to describe some signals (I2).
5.3 Tenet 2: Process Validates Signal
How does the signal described in Tenet 1 come to be seen as worth
conveying by an author? In other words, what validates the signal in
the eyes of the author, and subsequently in the eyes of the viewer?
5.3.1 Faith in Process Among Authors
A faith in process was one of the most common rationales among au-
thors for why omitting uncertainty information was acceptable. Inter-
viewees repeatedly emphasized the important role of process in vali-
dating claims made by visualizations. For example, a journalism inter-
viewee described how it is a journalist’s job is to make sure that infor-
mation they are presenting is “not so iffy that you need [uncertainty in-
formation]” (I2). Several other interviewees described how they often
collaborated with scientists or data analysts who would be responsible
for the statistical analysis behind a data visualization. In these scenar-
ios, faith in the analyst’s or scientist’s process as assumed. For exam-
ple, one interviewee alluded to how these data experts would “make
sure things are significant” (I2). Another suggested that “Scientists
generally don’t assert anything if there’s a fifty-one percent chance.
They wait until they’re really confident” (I8).
These comments would seem to imply that the truth value of sig-
nal is independent of the visualization, which simply expresses that
signal. However, more than half of interviewees mentioned ways in
which they used the visualization process to identify and clarify the
signal. For example, multiple industry interviewees framed the de-
sign process as “tuning” the visualization to optimize signal strength,
implying that a signal was not independent of the visualization design:
“Being able to change [the color palette] gives a way of reducing some
of that type of uncertainty... how do I make sure that if there’s a signal
in the dataset, you’re actually able to see it?” (I6) A journalism inter-
viewee described a process akin to looking for “visual significance”
(I5) in which visualization is used to establish if a pattern is trustwor-
thy. They described how in visualizing data for an upcoming story,
a colleague “realized you couldn’t see the pattern. It was statistically
not a very strong pattern. This isn’t supporting the case at all.” Several
interviewees described the visualization process as characterized by
looking for things that are “basically more true” (I3) or “more signal
than noise” (I1, I2). These remarks imply that authors use a threshold
to determine whether a signal is valid enough to share through visu-
alization, and that visualization plays a role in the identification and
strengthening of that signal.
5.3.2 Faith in Process Among Viewers
While authors look to their own or collaborators’ process to validate
a signal, viewers are not privy to these processes. From a statistical
standpoint, it would seem that an expression of uncertainty should be
required to establish trust whenever visualized data is intended for in-
ference.
However, multiple interviewees and survey respondents implied
that most viewers who they created visualizations for did not require
specific information about process or uncertainty to trust that a signal
is valid. One freelance interviewee replied sarcastically, “it’s more like
the opposite” (I13). Instead, some authors described trust as a perva-
sive default in visualization-based communication. As one industry
interviewee described it “There’s a participation in trust with the sys-
tem produced by the information, so wherever that comes from. Most
people will trust the doctor, not necessarily because the information
itself was trustworthy, but because the doctor was” (I8). In contrast to
the seemingly rational expectation that uncertainty would play a role
in fostering trust, the same interviewee described how a priori trust is
instead a necessary precondition to presenting uncertainty: “I would
say that you want trust established before you show uncertainty... My
hypothesis would be that it [uncertainty communication] may have no
effect for trust development.”
One industry interview described how the power of “professional
judgment” becomes salient in the transition between exploratory to
explanatory data analysis: “If you’ve gotten to the point where you’re
presenting this and as a professional, as a scientist you have deter-
mined that this is acceptable, and so the particulars of the uncertainty...
are almost like an engineer whiteboard interview. Somebody says,
‘What about the uncertainty bands around this point X?’ You’re like,
‘I see that too. I’m going to respond to that”’ (I11). When asked if
they had seen audiences asking for uncertainty communication in data
scientists’ presentations, the interviewee responded “They don’t care
in the short term. Uncertainty is a long-term strategic problem.”
Another freelance interviewee described how an organization they
had worked for could not assume the standard level of trust based
on the controversial nature of their business, and how this status im-
pacted their use of uncertainty visualization: “One of the things that
they were saying is because people don’t trust them, they have to go
overboard with authoritative looking charts and visuals... If they don’t
show workings, if they don’t show error bars and all these other things,
they’re in a losing battle ” (I4). Even if viewers are not always con-
sciously aware of the process used to identify the signal in a visual-
ization, that they trust the results of the author’s process helps explain
why conveying the “workings” through techniques like uncertainty vi-
sualization may often not be seen as necessary.
5.4 Tenet 3: Uncertainty Obfuscates Signal
If visualizations provide signal, uncertainty obfuscates that signal in
the eyes of many interviewees and survey respondents. Multiple sur-
vey respondents and interviewees alluded to perceptions of uncertainty
as separate and even “tangential” to visualized information. Describ-
ing the role of a journalist in providing a simplified message, a jour-
nalism interviewee described how “Uncertainty would be peripheral
to the message” (I2). Another journalism interviewee used a fash-
ion metaphor to visual representation of uncertainty to an unnecessary
accessory (I3). An industry interviewee described how uncertainty
“doesn’t feel like it’s actually part of the core aspect of the data visual-
ization” based on their experiences as a visualization expert in a large
corporation where analyses are regularly conveyed through visualiza-
tion (I11).
A more negative view of uncertainty as questioning the message
or signal in a visualization either came up spontaneously or was con-
firmed via questioning in nearly every interview. Beyond the 17%
of survey respondents for whom not wanting to “make the data seem
questionable” deterred them from presenting uncertainty, multiple sur-
vey respondents also associated the term “uncertainty visualization”
with questioning, as in “a visualization that asks a question,” and “how
to convey the possibility of divergence from a projection without cast-
ing doubt on the fundamental measurements.”
When it came to exactly how uncertainty obfuscates a signal, au-
thors alluded to several distinct ways. The first way is best described
as statistical: “Error could be so large that it invalidates the data.”
When asked if their organization, a large news publication, had de-
veloped explicit guidelines or norms for communicating uncertainty,
a journalism interviewee replied sarcastically that “we only show it
when we want to conclude the opposite. Uncertainty comes out most
when you want the trend to not be true” (I3). A survey respondent con-
versely described how viewers’ “are interested in uncertainty when it
is doesn’t overwhelm a clear takeaway.” Another survey respondent
openly admitted to choosing to omit uncertainty from a visualization
because “data wasn’t reliable and uncertainty seemed too big.”
A second way is best described as attentional, suggesting the po-
tentially distracting nature of uncertainty and the work it entails of
viewers. One journalism interviewee alluded to how it can be diffi-
cult to motivate the presentation of uncertainty from the standpoint of
what it provides for the viewer besides extra work: “you’re analyzing
your audience. Sometimes the editor is going to say, ‘we’re going to
lose views on this’, so they’ll want to omit it” (I5). Another freelancer
explained the non-value of uncertainty in many instances by saying
“it’s a constant battle to get bums on seats, but also then to make it
worthwhile for that bum being on the seat” (I4).
A third way is best described as procedural. Here, uncertainty ap-
pears to operate like a seam, or “crack” in the visualization that signals
the process behind it. One survey respondent described how uncer-
tainty visualization was to them “The answer to the question someone
will inevitably ask, ‘how did you get these numbers?”’ If this ques-
tion is in fact inevitable, it would seem more efficient for a visualiza-
tion author to try to answer the question in advance of being asked by
presenting uncertainty. However, many authors seemed motivated to
avoid this question where possible, lending further evidence to a belief
that viewers’ trust is a priori.
One reason for avoiding references to process is that authors may
not feel prepared to fully explain why the signal they were presenting
was valid. That many authors found it challenging to calculate uncer-
tainty and worried about producing wrong explanations provides some
support for this possibility.
A final way that authors implied that uncertainty can obfuscate is
social. Uncertainty is again analogous to a seam, but is perceived as
undermining the author’s credibility based on a violation of the trust
assumptions underlying norms. As one interviewee describes, “if you
go to the extent of trying to reassure people with workings and as-
sumptions and methodologies, that sense of administration wrapped
around a graphic is off-putting. It gives you a reading task. Actually,
sometimes it makes you think that people are trying too hard. There
must be something even more that they’re not telling me about” (I4).
It is worth noting that many authors seemed confident in stating ra-
tionales, as though they perceived them to be truths that do not require
examples to demonstrate. It is possible that rationales for omission
represent ingrained beliefs more than conclusions authors have drawn
from concrete experiences attempting to convey uncertainty.
6 MODELING INFERENCE IN COMMUNICATIVE VISUALIZATION
A reader may find it easy to spot inconsistencies across the model
tenets. For example, the efforts that authors go through to identify and
clarify a signal using visualization may seem unwarranted if viewers
are thought to default to accepting the truth value of signals they are
presented with. Or, the faith that authors have in their process to val-
idate a signal may seem at odds with their desire to avoid presenting
uncertainty when it can act as a seam that exposes aspects of that pro-
cess. Exposing inconsistencies may help in encouraging authors to
reconsider how their actions contribute to a norm of uncertainty omis-
sion despite good intentions.
Many statements authors made suggested that pragmatic concerns
about perceived consequences of communicating uncertainty often
outweighed their desire to communicate it. As a result, many authors’
might find blanket arguments that uncertainty communication is a duty
or moral imperative, as some have suggested [19], unsatisfying. For
example, the pragmatic author might believe that the challenges of un-
certainty for viewers make it credible to omit uncertainty whenever it
seems unlikely to change the inferences or decisions of the audience.
How then might proponents of uncertainty visualization convince
authors that uncertainty is critical to communicate despite the many
challenges with doing so? Reasoning more formally about how in-
ferences arise with uncertainty communication versus is one step to-
ward dismantling beliefs of omission as a defensible strategy on logi-
cal, rather than ethical, grounds. Toward this end, I adapt a theory of
statistical graphical inference for exploratory data analysis proposed
by Gelman [24, 25] to communicative visualization. I demonstrate
through examples how, in the absence of uncertainty, a viewer’s im-
plicit specification of a model to compare to observed data is drawn
from a seemingly infinite space of possible models. Uncertainty rep-
resentation necessarily constrains the set of possible models.
6.1 A Formal Theory of Visualization-Based Inference
Our goal is to formalize a definition of “signal” and of the process
that produces a signal as described in the rhetorical model. Several
statisticians have proposed that the process by which a person visually
examines a graph to evaluate the strength of evidence is analogous to a
statistical test [6, 8, 24, 25, 54]. While the primary goal of these analo-
gies has been to define methods for generating visualizations to com-
pare to observed data, accounts by Buja et al. [6] and Gelman [24, 25]
also acknowledge the role visualizations play in informal statistical
inference. In this process, a visualization is compared to an implicit
(i.e., imagined) reference distribution to determine whether the visual-
ization presents something interesting.
Gelman’s proposal [24, 25] describes the examination of a visual-
ization is a “model check”2 Assume a person looking at a visualization
to estimate some parameter values of interest θ . To take a simple ex-
ample, imagine a viewer looking at Figure 4a, which summarizes the
consistency of political attitude among samples of respondents who
identify as Democratic versus Republican over two time periods. Here
θ might represent a vector of estimates of the true Democrat and Re-
publican averages in 2004 and 2014.
We can imagine a viewer judging the strength of a signal in Fig-
ure 4a via an implicit (i.e., mental) comparison of the visualized data y
to a reference distribution T (yrep) (i.e., a distribution of outcomes pro-
duced by a hypothesized data-generating model). We can liken this to
comparing standardized test statistics T (y) and T (yrep). In a Bayesian
2Visual methods for enabling confirmatory analysis by hiding observed data
in a set of plots sampled from a “null plot distribution” [7], also known as
LineUps [2, 41, 54], can be considered one type of model check, though model
checking can also involve inferences aimed at understanding how data deviates
from model predictions.
Fig. 4: An adaption of a visualization presented by the Pew Founda-
tion [48], top, which shows Democratic and Republican respondents’
mean scores in 2004 and 2014 on a survey that measures consistency
in political attitude. The center of each x-axis represents political neu-
tral answers. Shifts in the means across the two years indicate changes
in how consistent respondents political attitudes are. Parts b, c, d, and
e depict varying model specifications that a viewer might formulate to
judge the strength of the visualization’s signal: assumed variance is
lower in b and c than d and e, and b and d fit a model to 2004 data
versus 2014 data in c and e.
framework, the data generating process is the posterior predictive dis-
tribution p(yrep|y), or the distribution of the outcome variable implied
by a model that used the observed data y to update a prior distribu-
tion of beliefs about the unknown model parameters θ [23]. A viewer
compares imagined simulations from p(yrep|y) to the observed data,
looking for discrepancies. A discrepancy function D(y,yrep) can be
thought of as a measure of the deviation between T (y) and T (yrep). As
commonly assumed in signal detection theory [26], the viewer might
subject the result of this function to some individualized threshold (i.e.,
a certain perceived probability that the value must be below) to decide
if the visualization presents “something interesting,” similar to how an
α level is used in assess a p-value in NHST.
What reference distribution might a viewer assume in examining
Figure 4a? One possibility is that a viewer is conducting a “visual
hypothesis test.” T (rrep) is drawn from a “null plot distribution” [7]
specifying plots that might be seen if there were in fact no difference
between the Democrat and Republican data. Here, the discrepancy
function D(y2014,y
rep
2004) could produce an intuitive estimates of the
probability that the T (y2014) could have in fact been generated by
p(yrep2004|y2004), similar to a p-value [24].
Conceiving of graphical inference as a model check is not to sug-
gest that viewers enact these processes consciously or identically to
the analogous statistical processes. In fact it may be more realistic to
assume that viewers may rely on various approximations to estimate
p(yrep|y) and D(y,yrep) (e.g, [36, 37]). The value of the formal model
lies in the way it summarizes potential mechanisms of graphical in-
ference to enable principle reasoning about the impacts of different
visualizations—in particular, the implications of omitting versus visu-
alizing uncertainty.
The posterior predictive distribution p(yrep|y) is a function of a
viewer’s prior beliefs about parameter values, their model specifica-
tion, and their perception of the data y including its variance. In the
absence of uncertainty representation, it seems unlikely that viewers
assume a common level of uncertainty in the observed data and use it
identically in fitting the model3. For example, viewers of Figure 4 top
are free to assume any values for the variance in each expected dis-
tribution of means (though distributions that exceed the x-axis range
would not be congruent with the meaning of the bounded measure-
ment). Figure 4b and c, versus d and e, demonstrate two possible
assumptions of variance (where the two parties’ variance is assumed
to be equal). These are just two variations on many different ways
the viewer might mentally “fill in” the missing information about the
authors’ intended inferences to decide if a chart presents a valid signal.
For Figure 4, as in many statistical applications, there are various
other degrees of freedom in the viewer’s specification of p(yrep|y)
which might return different results. Comparing Figure 4b and c
(or d and e) demonstrates how two applications of the basic simple
model structure, with a change to only which year’s data is used to
fit p(yrep|y), can lead to different conclusions by the viewer. Alter-
natively, a viewer might imagine both means in each year as samples
from a Gaussian distribution centered at political neutrality to estimate
the probability that one or both of the years represent real differences,
and compare how large the discrepancies from the model are across
years.
As another example, consider Figure 5, a line chart based on a
real world example of estimates of some countries’ debt to GDP ra-
tios [45]. Assume that the author presents the visualization with text
indicating the intended message, like the title “Ireland’s relative debt
grew quickly between 2006 and 2012.” Even with information about
the intended signal, there are multiple models that a viewer might use
to determine how much the trend for Ireland differs from that of the
other countries. If we assume a viewer is interested in the high level
disparity in the slope of Ireland from 2006 to 2012, then a simple linear
model structure y = α + β*x could suffice, but again the question arises
of what data is used to fit the model. One possibility is that the viewer
imagines a distribution of replicates (T (yrep)) drawn from a predictive
distribution fit to the data from 2006 and 2012 from all countries other
than Ireland. However, should the viewer assume the presented coun-
tries are intended to represent the larger set of all European countries
other than Ireland, or rely only on those in the visualization? With no
presentation of uncertainty, it is difficult to say which better captures
the authors’ intention. Viewers may also bring different prior beliefs;
imagine how the p(yrep|y) of a viewer who expects that Ireland under-
reported their national debt leading up to a financial 2009 crisis might
differ from that of a viewer with an uninformed prior.
Fig. 5: A visualization comparing government debt across countries.
A viewer might perceive a disparity between the average increase in
debt for Ireland between 2006 and 2012 and that of the other coun-
tries. Changing the visualization by removing data (e.g., Greece) or
extending axes ranges (e.g. y-axis to 0) could impact the strength of
signal that the viewer concludes.
6.1.1 Contradictions Exposed by the Model
From the rhetorical model, it seems likely that authors believe view-
ers’ model specifications, discrepancy functions, and thresholds will
be very similar to if not the same as theirs, as this is the “machinery”
that defines the signal for the author. However, that multiple authors
described using the visualization (T (y)) to judge the significance of
3A viewer might fit p(yrep|y) using only the observed values of predictors
or new observations of the predictors [23]
a pattern also implies that the data generating process that produces
the imagined T (yrep) (p(yrep|y) depends on the particulars of the vi-
sualization T (y). For example, without seeing the countries shown
in Figure 5, it would seem difficult to assume a viewer with a T (yrep
already in mind.
The discrepancy function D(y,yrep) will naturally change with T (y)
as well. For example, if the author of Figure 5 were to remove a
line from the reference set of countries that deviates somewhat from
the rest (e.g., Greece), then D(y,yrep) will presumably also change.
Similarly, increasing the range of values on the y-axis might imply
to some viewers that it would be reasonable to expect other countries
to have higher intercepts or greater slopes than those visualized. An
author’s perception that a signal has a truth value, which is defined
outside of the final communicative visualization (e.g., through signif-
icance testing), is therefore inconsistent with the graphical inference
model. These and other contradictions highlight the value of a formal
model for systematically demonstrating the implications of omitting
uncertainty.
6.1.2 How Uncertainty Can Help
With a formal model in place, it becomes possible to ask, What role
does visualizing uncertainty play in the graphical inference process?
Just as viewers may assume different reference distributions in deter-
mining the strength of a visualized signal, the role that explicit repre-
sentation of uncertainty plays in the inference process can vary based
on how uncertainty is formulated.
Ideally, there is a correspondence between how an author specifies
uncertainty and the graphical inference process that gave rise to their
judgments of signal strength. For example, imagine a visualization
T (y) that plots a new observation (or set of observations, as in Fig-
ure 4b that one wishes to assess in light of an explicitly visualized
reference distribution. The intervals surrounding the 2004 values in
Figure 4b essentially convey T (yrep). Compared to a mean value with
no interval, visualizing uncertainty around each estimates facilitates
the intended inference by greatly reducing degrees of freedom in the
viewer’s graphical inference process.
However, assuming a correspondence between the author’s infer-
ence and presented uncertainty is dangerous for several reasons. If the
author of a visualization like Figure 4b were to have also taken care to
visualize measurement error around the 2014 values, then it becomes
more difficult for viewers to be sure that the reference distribution they
infer was that which the author intended without further clarification
by the author. Perhaps more likely, based on the difficult of calcu-
lating and visualizing uncertainty, is that authors visualize uncertainty
in whatever way seems convenient rather than reflecting on how to
convey their own assumed reference distribution. Some authors’ pro-
fessed challenges communicating uncertainty of any kind suggest that
even when a reference distribution is intuitively salient, it may not be
obvious how to produce a depiction specifying p(yrep|y) for viewers.
Finally, research on the challenges many viewers face interpreting ex-
pressions statistical constructs like standard error or confidence inter-
val error bars [3, 28] suggests in is unlikely that all audiences could re-
liably infer the author’s modeling assumptions from some uncertainty
visualizations without additional description to guide their inference.
Given that an uncertainty visualization does not necessarily ensure
that all viewers formulate T (yrep), p(yrep|y), or even T (y) in the same
way, some authors may feel validated in their choice to omit uncer-
tainty. Perhaps it may seem permissable to omit uncertainty if one’s
analysis process has passed some sufficiently high level of robustness
or rigor, out of a desire to avoid potential heterogeneity in beliefs that
might result from visualizing it. However, an author would need to be-
lieve that the diversity of forms T (yrep) takes with uncertainty is even
greater than that taken without. Visualizing uncertainty conveys more
information about potential reference distributions, and consequently
data generating processes, even when it does not directly correspond
to the author’s graphical inference process. This reduces the amount of
information that a viewer must mentally “fill in,” which would seem to
necessarily reduce variance in interpretations across viewers. Instead
of throwing up one’s hands at potential heterogeneity in uncertainty
interpretations, one might conclude that authors should not only strive
to depict uncertainty more, they should strive to depict uncertainty as
defined by their own inference process. One might call this process
“reference model visualization” to suggest its importance for guiding
viewers’ unavoidable implicit inferences.
7 DISCUSSION
The results presented here suggest that uncertainty communication
is far from a solved problem for visualization authors. Various ra-
tionales for omitting uncertainty emerged from my survey and inter-
views. However, many authors also said they would like to communi-
cate uncertainty more frequently, and expressed intuitions that doing
so would shift people’s general tolerance for and ability to reason with
uncertainty. This tension and others lead me to suggest that, as one in-
terviewee put it: “uncertainty is a long-term strategic problem” (I11).
The rhetorical and graphical inference models provide a theoreti-
cal basis for reasoning about uncertainty omission, one that is con-
sistent with authors’ general perceptions of uncertainty visualization
as “a visualization that doesn’t have a clear message.” These con-
tributions are a call to action for visualization and human computer
interaction researchers to extend their efforts beyond the creation of
specific techniques and applications, and to consider the larger back-
ground of incentives, norms, experiences, and insecurities that under-
gird uncertainty omission. Are we in a “bad equilibrium” [44] as one
economist has asked? If so, what will it take to change this state? In
an era of increased data rhetoric, political propaganda, and public fears
around predictive modeling, research efforts toward shifting commu-
nication norms to require uncertainty communication are more critical
than ever.
The importance of understanding the problem of uncertainty omis-
sion at scale is not to say that researchers should lessen their efforts
toward producing widely accessible and generalizable techniques for
visualizing uncertainty. One interviewee described how an engineer
at their company argued, “Uncertainty visualization is solved. Just
use these hypothetical outcome plots.” The interviewee mused “That’s
great, except people aren’t using them.” That many authors described
challenges and insecurities about visualizing uncertainty suggests that
visualization researchers may be failing in disseminating their results
in terms that meet authors where they are at. Tools that help visual-
ization authors not just visualize but calculate and explain uncertainty
are well motivated by my results, as is research into the value that au-
thors perceive in more approximate uncertainty communications, like
showing views that problematize a default level of aggregation or us-
ing perceptual effects to convey imprecision.
Arguments that communicating uncertainty is an author’s moral im-
perative [19] are one way researchers and authors may try to inspire
changes in practice. Indeed, some authors I surveyed and interviewed
expressed a belief that uncertainty communication was a responsibil-
ity. However, even these authors admitted to not visualizing uncer-
tainty as often as they thought they should (or at all). While readers
may find it ethically questionable that some authors would omit pre-
senting uncertainty when it could call into question the message of the
graphic, I intentionally avoided such value judgments in analyzing and
compiling the perceptions I reported on. Instead, the formal model I
presented aims to provide logical ground for countering pervasive and
often pragmatic rationales for omission.
Of course, an abstract logical argument may not be of any more
interest to authors than an ethical one. However, it may be possible
to help authors consider the implications of uncertainty omission ver-
sus inclusion through concrete examples. For example, researchers
could develop tools that allow an author to simulate possible reference
distributions that viewers may adopt. Another promising approach to
making the implications of omission versus inclusion more concrete
is to apply decision theory to help readers reason about the impacts
of their visualization. Such an approach could motivate design tools
that prompt an author to consider possible “worst case” decisions (or
actions) viewers might take under uncertainty omission versus inclu-
sion. The latter approach may be particularly useful in scenarios where
the author would otherwise not think through how their visualization
might impact viewers’ decisions or beliefs. Finally, recent approaches
to visualization evaluation that apply Bayesian cognition to evaluate
how viewers update their beliefs after using a visualization [37] may
be a further avenue for helping authors perceive the implications of
uncertainty more concretely.
Beyond reasoning about uncertainty omission, formalizing “intu-
itive” statistical graphical inference could increase awareness among
researchers and practitioners around the cognitive and perceptual pro-
cesses that give rise to perceived signal in a communicative visualiza-
tion. A formal science of visual communication stands to improve
visualization-practice writ broadly, while integrating uncertainty as
part of the definition of a visualization. Researchers could, for exam-
ple, develop tools to help authors articulate the graphical inferences
that they target and create appropriate expressions of uncertainty to
communicate these to viewers.
7.0.1 Limitations
I surveyed and interviewed 103 visualization authors. The beliefs I
summarized may not describe all authors’ impressions. In particular, I
observed considerable heterogeneity in authors’ practices and percep-
tions around the value of uncertainty communication. That a policy of
always including uncertainty information in a visualization could seem
obvious to some authors and baffling to others tells of the complexity
of this topic in communicative visualization.
As described earlier, the participants that I surveyed may over-
represent authors who feel that uncertainty visualization is important.
The set of influencers I interviewed may overrepresent authors who
are sympathetic or at least open-minded enough about uncertainty to
agree to an interview. Interview and survey results may also be biased
by participants’ abilities to retrospectively recall their choices and ra-
tionales around uncertainty communication.
8 CONCLUSION
Most visualizations outside of scientific journals do not explicitly rep-
resent uncertainty information. This work asked, why? By surveying
and interviewing authors who regularly create visualizations for oth-
ers, I identified perceptions, practices, challenges, and attitudes asso-
ciated with uncertainty visualization. My results suggest that many
authors are optimistic about the importance of visualizing uncertainty,
but may face challenges calculating, visualizing, and explaining un-
certainty to viewers. However, these challenges were not sufficient
to explain why authors who acknowledge the benefits of uncertainty
might default to omitting uncertainty. To summarize how a norm of
uncertainty omission might seem reasonable, I contribute a rhetori-
cal model that describes pervasive associations and expectations about
uncertainty among authors. I apply a formal model of of graphical
statistical inference to shed light on how visualizations are examined
to determine the strength of a signal, and demonstrate how uncertainty
reduces (though does not necessarily eliminate) degrees of freedom in
viewers’ inferences.
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